Criteria of validity for animal models of psychiatric disorders: focus on anxiety disorders and depression by Belzung, Catherine & Lemoine, Maël
REVIEW Open Access
Criteria of validity for animal models of
psychiatric disorders: focus on anxiety disorders
and depression
Catherine Belzung
1* and Maël Lemoine
2
Abstract
Animal models of psychiatric disorders are usually discussed with regard to three criteria first elaborated by Willner;
face, predictive and construct validity. Here, we draw the history of these concepts and then try to redraw and
refine these criteria, using the framework of the diathesis model of depression that has been proposed by several
authors. We thus propose a set of five major criteria (with sub-categories for some of them); homological validity
(including species validity and strain validity), pathogenic validity (including ontopathogenic validity and triggering
validity), mechanistic validity, face validity (including ethological and biomarker validity) and predictive validity
(including induction and remission validity). Homological validity requires that an adequate species and strain be
chosen: considering species validity, primates will be considered to have a higher score than drosophila, and
considering strains, a high stress reactivity in a strain scores higher than a low stress reactivity in another strain.
Pathological validity corresponds to the fact that, in order to shape pathological characteristics, the organism has
been manipulated both during the developmental period (for example, maternal separation: ontopathogenic
validity) and during adulthood (for example, stress: triggering validity). Mechanistic validity corresponds to the fact
that the cognitive (for example, cognitive bias) or biological mechanisms (such as dysfunction of the hormonal
stress axis regulation) underlying the disorder are identical in both humans and animals. Face validity corresponds
to the observable behavioral (ethological validity) or biological (biomarker validity) outcomes: for example
anhedonic behavior (ethological validity) or elevated corticosterone (biomarker validity). Finally, predictive validity
corresponds to the identity of the relationship between the triggering factor and the outcome (induction validity)
and between the effects of the treatments on the two organisms (remission validity). The relevance of this
framework is then discussed regarding various animal models of depression.
Introduction
In recent years, the translational approach, which aims
at bridging the gaps between basic animal research and
medical practice, has gained much popularity. This con-
cept, although not new in medicine, became popular
with its introduction in the National Institutes of Health
Roadmap initiative [1,2]. It applies also to the field of
psychiatry, and particularly to the one of affective disor-
ders, a nosographical entity including depression and
anxiety disorders. In the framework of translational
medicine, a robust approach should include both
research going from the bench to the bedside (from
animals to humans, or from basic to clinical research)
but also ‘back translation research’ (from humans to ani-
mals). Most efforts have been devoted to the former,
focusing on the design of animal models (particularly
using rodents) that would be relevant to study the
human disorder and to predict the therapeutic outcomes
of future treatments. Unfortunately, little research fol-
lows the opposite direction, using the back-translational
approach and thus going from the bedside to the bench.
However, this method is crucial when trying to assess
t h ef u n c t i o no fs o m em e c h a n i s m sd i s c o v e r e di na n i m a l
models in the pathophysiology of human disorders and
when trying to discover new treatments for these condi-
tions. For example, the contribution of hippocampal
neurogenesis in the pathophysiology of depression and
in the therapeutic efficacy of pharmacological treatments
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confirmed in human studies [7,8]. In any case, these
approaches require that these rodent models are suitable
to study the clinical condition.
Two opposite attitudes exist. The first is one of skepti-
cism: animal models already have limited interest even in
the case of diseases affecting largely shared physiological
systems among mammals. How could they be reliable in
the case of largely specific features of the human species,
such as diseases involving mostly disorders of the higher
cognitive abilities? For instance, how could one distin-
guish a rodent model for autism from a rodent model for
schizophrenia? Is there a relevant difference between
rodent models of depressive disorders and rodent models
of anxiety disorders? The second attitude is constructive,
and consists of trying to elevate the quality of our mod-
els, regardless of general and theoretical objections.
Instead of falling into evolutionary or even philosophical
debates, the question then focuses on methodological
concerns. This paper takes the second attitude. More
specifically, the improvement of the validity of animal
models has been addressed through the proposal of qual-
ity criteria since the 1960s. These criteria have continued
to evolve. It seems timely to reassess them and possibly
recast the standards of this core part of translational
research. After having outlined the traditional standard
criteria, the present paper thus propounds an up-to-date
set of such criteria of animal models’ validity.
A review of the classic criteria of validity for
animal models of psychiatric disorders
According to several authors, an animal model of a psy-
chiatric condition should fulfill a multidimensional set
of criteria of validity to be considered relevant for
human pathology. Many authors have proposed a list of
such criteria, focusing on models of depression and
models of anxiety (see Table 1). Interestingly, since the
1960s, authors have felt increasingly concerned with cri-
teria of external validity and less with criteria of internal
validity (with exceptions such as [9-11]). Internal validity
addresses the consistency of the experimental design:
reproducibility, inter-observer reliability, randomization,
multicentric design, design (test-control), blind experi-
mentation, and so on. These questions are indeed not
specific to animal studies, but are widely shared across
all fields of experimental science [11]. On the other
hand, external validity concerns the general question of
the applicability of the results of a study on a sample to
the target population: it obviously raises supplemental
concern in the case of animal models because of the
necessity to resort to analogical arguments. It is these
concerns that led to the need for specific criteria for
ensuring the external validity of animal studies. To our
knowledge, the first attempt to define such criteria of
validity for animal models was elaborated in 1964 by
Janssen [12]. This author proposed eight criteria to
decide whether a procedure was relevant or not:
Table 1 Criteria for animal models of depression and of anxiety disorders
Reference N Predictive validity Face
validity
Construct validity Others
[12] 8 Specificity Efficiency
Speed
Simplicity
Reproducibility
Adequate design
Adequate data processing
Correlation with other tests
[13] 5 Similar response to treatments Analogy of
symptoms
Observable and measurable behavioral changes
Interobserver agreement Reproducibility of the
system
[14] 4 Is the model thorough in
describing features of its cures?
Similarity of cure
Symptoms
similarity
Is the model thorough in
describing features of its cause?
Similarity of physiology, cause
Does model describe the disorder or a sub-
category?
Is the model thorough in describing features of
its prevention? Similarity of prevention
[17] 3 Predictability Isomorphism Homology
[9] 6 Predictive validity Face validity Construct validity Reliability
Etiological validity
Convergent validity
Discriminant validity
[28] 3 Predictive Face Construct
[18] 6 Predictive Face Etiological validity
Construct validity
Convergent validity
Reliability
[19] 3 Predictive Face Construct
The criteria proposed by various authors are compared to the three criteria elaborated by Willner (1994) [15]. N: number of proposed criteria.
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adequate design and data processing and correlation
with other tests. These criteria did mainly apply to
screening tests, and were rather pragmatic, as research-
ers were mainly interested in finding a device and/or
protocol enabling them to rapidly test new compounds.
It is to be noticed also that these criteria are not really
relevant to translational research, as they did not refer
to the clinical condition: the idea here was not to model
a disorder, but to find a reproducible, reliable and rapid
method to test compounds. Interestingly, this list mostly
focused on criteria of internal validity. The first paper
that explicitly proposed criteria for ‘animal models’,
focusing on external validity, was published 5 years later
by McKinney and Bunney [13] and focused on depres-
sion. The literature in the field of animal models of
affective disorders frequently cites this paper, claiming
that McKinney and Bunney proposed four validity cri-
teria (same etiology, same symptoms, same response to
treatments and same biochemistry). As a matter of fact,
this article presents the available methods to induce
depressive-like symptoms and then proposes five
requirements for an animal model: analogy of symp-
toms, existence of observable and measurable behavioral
changes, interobserver agreement, same response to
treatments and reproducibility of the system. However,
these criteria were not well defined at that time, as their
description was limited to ones e n t e n c ei nt h i so r i g i n a l
paper. Interestingly, these authors propose the criterion
of similarity in symptoms and in response to treatments,
which recapitulates two of the four criteria that are
usually attributed to these authors. Concerning the two
remaining criteria of the list of four (same etiology and
same biochemistry), they cannot be recapitulated under
the three remaining concepts they propose. For exam-
ple, similarity in etiology is not really explicitly men-
tioned in that list, even if in the paper the authors
describe social loss as one of the factors that can be
used to elicit depressive-like symptoms. In 1977, addi-
tional criteria were added by Abramson and Seligman
[14]; they mentioned the similarity of etiology, but also
an interesting criterion that was unfortunately aban-
doned: the precision of the sub-nosographic entity
(’Does the laboratory model describe (...) a naturally
occurring psychopathology or only a subgroup?’). How-
ever, most of the researchers working in the field of ani-
mal models of depression rely on the proposal made by
Willner in 1984 of three criteria of validity: face validity,
predictive validity and construct validity [15]. Willner
(personal communication) was inspired by the latter cri-
terion as proposed 30 years earlier by Cronbach and
Meehl [16] in the field of psychology. Note that these
criteria are still used by the European Federation of Psy-
chologists’ Association, albeit under different
terminology. Willner’s article can really be considered
seminal in the field of animal models of psychiatric dis-
orders (it is cited 547 times in March 2011), and most
authors now refer to it, either by changing some of the
criteria of that list or by adding a hierarchy between
these criteria. Soubrié and Simon [17] for example
rather use the French terms for ‘homology’, ‘isomorph-
ism’ and ‘predictability’ while Koob et al.[ 1 8 ]d on o t
include predictive validity but add etiological validity
and convergent validity. Geyer and Markou [9] include
etiological validity, convergent and discriminant validity,
and claim that predictive validity is the crucial aspect.
Koob et al. consider reliability and predictive validity to
be essential criteria, while face, convergent, etiological
and construct validity are more secondary. For Sarter
and Bruno [19], on the other hand, construct validity is
much more important than face and predictive validity.
For Robbins [20], homology is central for construct
validity. However, it is possible that these diverging
points of view also stem from different definitions of the
various criteria. We thus will first try to carefully exam-
ine the definition of the various criteria, by focusing on
the three criteria proposed by Willner [15] or their
equivalents.
Predictive validity
According to Willner [15], predictive validity relies on
five sub-criteria: ‘whether a model correctly identifies (1)
antidepressant treatments of pharmacologically diverse
types (2), without making errors of omission (3) or com-
mission (4), and whether potency in the model corre-
lates with clinical potency (5).’ According to this
definition, this criterion really relies on a pharmacologi-
cal correlation (non-pharmacological treatments are not
mentioned). It is clear from these examples that this cri-
terion is not at all intended to translate aspects of
human pathology in animals, as it is only concerned
with pharmacological effects. In another paper by the
same authors [21], the criterion has been extended to
include response to all available treatments (for exam-
ple, in the case of depression, not only pharmacological
antidepressants but also electroconvulsive therapy), so
that one can conclude that it can correspond to a
human-animal correlation of therapeutic outcomes. This
concept is similar to one of the criteria proposed by
McKinney and Bunney [13], as the description given by
these authors (’The treatment modalities effective in
reversing depression in humans should reverse the
changes seen in animals’) more or less recapitulates
Willner’s sub-criteria 1, 2 and 3. It is, however, not con-
vergent with the ‘specificity’ criteria of Janssen [12] who
claimed, ‘Specificity, a given drug effects being charac-
teristic for a well-defined class of chemicals and indica-
tive of a specific mode of action.’ There is no reference
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ment should reverse disease-related symptoms. How-
ever, the definition employed by Koob et al. [18] is
quite different, in their paper focusing on anxiety, pre-
dictive validity is defined as ‘the ability to make consis-
tent predictions about anxiety based on an animal’s
performance in the model.’ Definitions convergent with
this proposal can also be found in Geyer and Markou’s
paper [9], as these authors extend this criterion to what
‘allows one to make predictions about the human phe-
nomenon based on the performance of the model.’ It is
clear that their use of the term ‘prediction’ is not limited
to the ability to predict the efficacy of treatments. So,
this criterion of predictive validity is, in most cases, lim-
ited to the ability of the model to accurately respond to
the treatments that are employed, but some authors also
use it in a broader sense, including the model’sa p t i t u d e
to predict some specific markers of the disease.
Face validity
For Willner [15], ‘Face validity is assessed by whether
antidepressant effects are only present on, or are poten-
tiated by, chronic administration (1), and whether the
model resembles depression in a number of respects (2),
which are specific to depression (3), and do actually
coexist in a specific sub-group of depressions (4); also,
the model should not show features which are not seen
clinically (5).’ By this definition, face validity interest-
ingly encompasses both some treatment features and
symptomatic aspects. Examples that Willner uses to
illustrate this criterion include reserpine reversal,
amphetamine potentiation, 5-hydroxytryptophan-
induced depression, bulbectomy, isolation-induced
hyperactivity, exhaustion stress and disturbance of circa-
dian rhythms. The discussion about the fact that face
validity applies to these models makes it clear that,
according to this author, face validity includes both
pharmacological similarity and phenomenological iden-
tity. For example, he mentions that in the unpredictable
chronic mild stress (UCMS) model, antidepressants are
effective after chronic, but not acute, treatment. He also
notes that reserpine induces similar behavioral effects in
animals and in humans, that hyperactivity and heigh-
tened glucocorticoid levels are observed both in
depressed people and in rodents subjected to bulbect-
omy or to unpredictable chronic stress, and that eleva-
tion of the threshold for intracranial self-stimulation
resembles the anhedonia displayed by depressed people.
Later on, the same author claims that face validity cor-
responds to ‘the extent of similarity between the model
and the disorder is examined, on as wide as possible a
range of symptoms and signs’ [21]. Here, therapeutic
outcomes are not explicitly mentioned anymore and the
definition rather shifts toward requiring the identity of
symptoms. This is reminiscent of McKinney and Bunney
proposing that, the symptoms of the depression so
induced should be reasonably analogous to those seen
in human depression’ [13]. Geyer and Markou [9], as
well as Sarter and Bruno [19], define face validity as ‘the
degree of phenomenological similarity between the
model and the disorder to be modeled.’ It should be
noted that this phenomenological identity, as formulated
here, encompasses the behavioral and/or cognitive
aspects only, not their physiological and/or neural bases.
This suggests that, in fact, face validity corresponds to
an attempt to mimic diagnostic criteria of the psychia-
tric conditions, such as those listed in the tenth revision
of the World Health Organization’s International Statis-
tical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Pro-
blems (ICD-10) or the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Men-
tal Disorders (DSM-IV); indeed, these criteria are gener-
ally behavioral and/or cognitive only, without referring
to any etiology or biological basis. Another aspect
should be considered here. In recent years, a debate has
emerged (see, for example, [2,22-24]) between the view
that a relevant model should in fact apply to the disor-
der (depression, for example) or rather to dimensions,
symptoms and/or endophenotypes (a model of anhedo-
nia for example). In the first case, the phenomenon to
be mimicked corresponds to a set of probably interde-
pendent variables, while in the second case, there is no
attempt to model a disorder, but rather to model one
particular dimension of a disorder, which is possible if
the various symptoms of a given pathology are indepen-
dent from the others. In the first case, the changes
observed in the animal should include several dimen-
sions. For example, a model of depression should
include anhedonia, but also changes in mood, in appe-
tite, in sleep, and so on.
Construct validity
Concerning construct validity, the picture is rather com-
plex and the views defended by various authors are
summarized in Table 2. In his seminal paper on animal
models of depression, Willner [15] proposed that con-
struct validity correspond to the fact that ‘both the
behavior in the model (1) and the features of depression
being modeled (2) can be unambiguously interpreted,
and are homologous (3), and whether the feature being
modeled stands in an established empirical (4) and theo-
retical (5) relationship to depression.’ The paper then
describes several animal models of depression, discuss-
ing the fact that these models may or may not fulfill the
construct validity requirement. Willner then discusses
six methods for their potential ability to fulfill the con-
struct validity criterion: learned helplessness, behavioral
despair, UCMS, maternal separation, incentive
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list to be found in [25] for anxiety models). This discus-
sion indicates that sub-criterion 5, theoretical relation-
ship to depression, is understood in a very broad and
polysemic sense. It includes theories about the nature of
the depressive state, the crucial impact of some dysfunc-
tional processes (for example, that helplessness or anhe-
donia are central symptoms in depression), the dynamic
of the disorder (for example, its biphasic course) and its
etiology. The etiology, in turn, includes theories about
the part some external events take in the triggering of a
depressive-like state (stress or separation may cause
depression in humans and depressive-like symptoms in
non-human mammals), the central importance of some
specific characteristics of these events (uncontrollability
or unpredictability of the stressors as central mechan-
isms) and the involvement of underlying biological pro-
cesses (for example, the participation of a dysfunction of
the brain reward system).
These aspects could be considered different sub-
dimensions of this criterion. The same concept, in
which construct validity is seen as an attempt to estab-
lish a theoretical rationale of animal models both at the
level of a similarity of the behavioral and/or cognitive
dysfunctional processes and at the level of a similarity of
the etiology, was developed in later papers by Willner
[21]. In a book chapter on animal models of depression
[26], the same author explicates two additional facts;
firstly, that similarity between the biological dysfunc-
tions in the clinical population and in the animal model
is an essential aspect of this criterion; secondly, that
homology between the modeled processes is not only
required in addition to a similarity in the etiology and
the cause of the abnormalities seen, but the link
between these two levels should be translated as well: ‘a
theoretical account of the disordered behavior in the
model, a theoretical account of the disorder itself, and a
means to bring the two theories into alignment.’
In other terms, this means that if one considers that
anhedonia, for example, is a crucial feature of
depression (the first requirement above) and should be
present in the animal model, and that anhedonia is
caused by a dysfunction of the brain reward system
including the nucleus accumbens (the second require-
ment), then the relationship between anhedonia and the
function of the nucleus accumbens should be the same
in animals and humans and its dysfunction should be
similar in the depressed subjects and in the animal sub-
jected to the model. A close assumption is found by Sar-
ter and Bruno [19]. However, in the paper by Geyer and
Markou [9], construct validity is also defined in relation
to theoretical constructs, but it is clearly separated from
etiological validity. Having given the example of the
UCMS model, they claim thatt h i sp r o t o c o ld r a w sf r o m
theories on the link between ‘stress and consummatory
behavior’, and assume that the role of stress in depres-
sion and anhedonia is a core symptom of depression.
However, when trying to discuss this criterion, many
authors ignore the first aspect (the similarity of the the-
oretical construct about the dysfunctional cognitive,
behavioral and/or psychological processes) and thus
mention only the second aspect, that is, the similarity of
the etiology, either when theorizing about the external
events causing the depressive state or focusing on the
underlying biological basis (see [25] for an exception).
For example, concerning the first aspect, UCMS trans-
lates the diathesis theory of depression, as stress in vulner-
able rodents may induce depressive-like behaviors. The
diathesis theory of depression claims that depression
relates to a predisposition that has been acquired during
the developmental period, resulting both from genetic and
from environmental factors and rendering the subject
more vulnerable to triggering factors such as stress. The
second aspect can be illustrated with the example of the
model consisting of corticosterone administration in mice
[27], which in fact relies on the theory that depression is
related to a dysfunction of the hypothalamus-pituitary-
adrenal axis. Interestingly, when discussing a given animal
model of affective disorder with regard to this criterion of
construct validity, most authors only focus on one of these
Table 2 Definitions for “construct validity”
Definition Reference
’Whether both the behavior in the model (1) and the features of depression being modeled (2) can be unambiguously interpreted, and
are homologous (3), and whether the feature being modeled stands in an established empirical (4) and theoretical (5) relationship to
depression.’
[15]
’a theoretical account of the disordered behavior in the model, a theoretical account of the disorder itself, and a means to bring the
two theories into alignment’
[26]
’Construct validity of a test is commonly defined as the accuracy with which the test measures what it is intended to measure’ [9]
’the accuracy with which the model measures what it is intended to measure’ [18]
’bring the theoretical accounts of both the disorder itself and the disordered behavior exhibited by the model into alignment’ [21]
’a theory-driven, experimental substantiation of the behavioral and/or neuronal components of the model’
’(...) map a theory about the biopsychological mechanisms of a human disorder on to a biopsychotheory of a particular animal behavior’
[19]
Belzung and Lemoine Biology of Mood & Anxiety Disorders 2011, 1:9
http://www.biolmoodanxietydisord.com/content/1/1/9
Page 5 of 14aspects, insisting either only on theories about the dys-
functional process (for example, focusing on helplessness
for the learned helplessness model), on the biological etiol-
ogy (a defect in glucocorticoid release regulation in the
corticosterone administration model) or on the early
environmental etiology (maternal separation). In some
cases, such as the unpredictable mild stress model, the
construct validity criterion can be discussed according to
several of these sub-dimensions, including the importance
of stress in triggering the depressive episode, the crucial
nature of the unpredictability of these stressors in the
etiology of the disorder and the centrality of anhedonia.
However, the crucial importance of this construct validity
criterion is not emphasized by all authors. For example,
according to Weiss and Kilts, ‘although theoretically based
models are likely to provide interesting and valuable infor-
mation about the relation of certain behaviors to physiolo-
gical changes, they face no fewer fundamental problems in
establishing their validity as models of diagnostic cate-
gories than did the psychodynamic formulation they have
replaced’ [ 2 8 ] .T a b l e s1a n d2r e c a pt h er e s u l t so ft h i s
review.
A reformulation of the classic criteria of validity
These criteria would benefit from being defined more
precisely. For instance, Treit et al. [29] have very criti-
cally assessed the precision and the applicability of the
three traditional criteria. An animal model can be
thought of as a three-stage input-output process
intended to resemble the original path to disease (see
Figure 1). On this basis, nine criteria on the overall
validity of an animal model, whatever the disorder is,
can be proposed. These include five major criteria, from
which four (homological validity, pathogenic validity,
face validity and predictive validity) can be sub-divided
into two sub-criteria each. It is necessary to compare
these new criteria with the traditional criteria presented
earlier. As a matter of fact, this new proposal is not
intended to simply subdivide and sharpen Willner’so r i -
ginal three criteria of validity, but rather consists of an
integration of Willner’s criteria into a broader frame-
w o r k .B ys od o i n g ,a l t h o u g hp a r to fh i st e r m i n o l o g yi s
salvaged, the meaning is not necessarily the same. In the
end, it will also be clarifying to apply these new criteria
to well-known models.
[]
Initial
Organism
Vulnerable
Organism
Triggering
factors
Therapeutic agent
Behavioral
symptoms
Biological
markers
Etiological factors
Early environmental
factors
Pathological
Organism
Figure 1 A framework for animal models. Animal models are not just organisms supposed to resemble a human dysfunction: the processes
by which both animal and humans fall into this state must also be similar. Here is a simplified representation of how this occurs.
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An animal model of a disease is not just a model of the
action of a therapeutic agent at time t. It has to draw
from the comparison between two pathological organ-
isms [25] but possibly should also mimic the temporal
and etiological process of transformation from a healthy
organism to a pathological one via the state of vulner-
ability. The field of biological psychiatry has been dra-
matically improved lately thanks to the concept of
diathesis.
Figure 1 represents the proposed general framework.
The initial organism consists of a set of mechanisms
mainly defined by genetic properties. It is then exposed
to etiological factors. First, early environmental factors
transform it, mainly through epigenetic mechanisms,
into a vulnerable organism. The initial organism can be
either vulnerable or non-vulnerable from a genetic point
of view. Therefore some models aim directly at the
transformation of an initial, vulnerable organism into a
pathological organism; however on most models this
defines the second step. Second, triggering factors
occurring in adulthood transform the vulnerable organ-
ism into a pathological organism. This third state of the
organism is considered to be significantly different from
t h ef i r s to n e .T h ed i f f e r e n c ed e f i n e st h ec o g n i t i v ea n d
biological mechanisms underlying the disease.
The pathological organism in turn produces pathologi-
cal effects in the form of behavioral symptoms and bio-
logical markers. They are supposed to be significantly
reduced under the action of a therapeutic agent on the
organism which produces them. This reduction can be
thought of as a backward process in which the patholo-
gical organism goes back to ‘vulnerability’ status. It has
been shown that the ‘vulnerable’ status is related to
some epigenetic changes involving processes such as
region-specific DNA-methylation or histone acetylation.
For example, histone deacetylase 2 has been found to be
increased in mice vulnerable to social defeat [30] and
the histone deacetylase inhibitor, sodium butyrate, exerts
antidepressant-like effects [31], suggesting that it might
be possible in the future to reverse not only the patholo-
gical state, but also to shift vulnerability to a resilient
state. So, it might be possible in the future to extend
the backward process not only from a pathological to a
vulnerable status, but also from a pathological or a vul-
nerable status to a resilient status.
Criteria of validity
An animal model has validity inasmuch as it is similar
to a modeled human disease. The different aspects of
this similarity have to be assessed independently. On the
basis of the model of animal models presented above,
we propose five major criteria (with sub-categories for
some of them). Figure 2 recaps the criteria.
Homological validity
The homological validity of an animal model assesses
two choices - that of the species and that of a particular
strain of the species. For instance, Caenorhabditis ele-
gans is a poor choice to model the reduction of the hip-
pocampal volume in depression, but a better one to
model basic serotonergic phenomena under stress (see
[22] for both a discussion of the concept of homology
and a thorough analysis of the difficulties of the choice
of a particular species for an animal model). The choice
of a particular strain is also part of the homological
validity of an animal model. For example, the Flinders
S e n s i t i v eL i n eo fr a tw o u l db eam o r er e l e v a n tc h o i c e
than the Flinders Resistant Line when trying to model
depression, as they have been suggested to be prone to
display depressive-like states, both at the behavioral and
biological levels (see [32] for a review).
Pathogenic validity
The pathogenic validity of a model assesses the similar-
ity of the processes that lead to disease. It thus seems
useful to contrast ontopathogenic validity,t h a ti s ,e a r l y
environmental factors whose interaction with the initial
organism produces a vulnerable organism according to
the theory of diathesis, with triggering validity,t h a ti s ,
the similarity of triggering factors occurring during
adulthood whose interactions with either a vulnerable or
an initial organism produces a pathological organism.
For instance, maternal care deprivation is generally
considered an early environmental factor rendering the
subject vulnerable to depressive-like states in adulthood
[33-35] and, thus, has good ontopathogenic validity. A
possible mechanism for this is altered regulation of the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, as has been
shown previously [36]. In rats, early postnatal maternal
separation (3 hours/day, from postnatal day 1 to 14)
also induces depressive-like behavior associated with
HPA hyperactivity once the offspring reaches adulthood
(see [37] or, for a review, see [38]). One can thus con-
sider that early postnatal separation in rats might have
good ontopathogenic validity (as the experimental
manipulations have been undertaken during the devel-
opmental period of the subject). Maternal deprivation
cannot be considered a triggering factor (it does not
occur during adulthood and does not directly trigger a
depressive-like episode); therefore it has poor triggering
validity.
It is important to note that etiological factors do not
have to be materially similar (from a biochemical point
of view), but rather semantically similar (what they
mean to an organism). For example, a cat might elicit
fear in rodents, while in humans a white bear might
induce the same state. The two stimuli (cat and bear)
are not materially identical, but have the same meaning
(threat) in the rodents and the humans world. The same
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muli for different species, and the same physical stimu-
lus can have different meanings for different species.
Mechanistic validity
The mechanistic validity of an animal model assesses
the similarity of the mechanism we suppose or know is
working in the animal disease to the mechanism that is
or is presumed to be working in the human disease. It
refers at the same time to the mechanism that we think
is producing the symptoms and biological markers, and
to the mechanism we think is sensitive to the action of
effective therapeutic agents. This mechanism can be
either cognitive or neurobiological. This similarity of
mechanism is quite independent from the similarity of
the effects of the mechanisms. For instance, even if the
serotonergic organism is impaired in the same manner
in both depressed animal subjects and depressed human
patients, neither the symptoms nor the biological mar-
kers are necessarily the same. Indeed, what is observed
is not the direct effect of the mechanism, but rather the
result of the interaction of this mechanism with a lot of
other mechanisms in the organism. Therefore, mechan-
istic validity and face validity have to be assessed
independently.
Face validity
The face validity of an animal model is the similarity of
what is observed in the animal model to what is
observed in the human modeled organism. Face validity
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Figure 2 Criteria of validity for animal models. A comparison between the general process of the human disease (on the lower plane) and
its animal model (on the higher plan). The orthogonal black arrows link the crucial points of similarity between the parallel processes and
represent the different criteria of overall validity for animal models (or the various kinds of validity according to which an animal model ought to
be designed).
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validity. The former is the similarity of behaviors related
to the presumed pathological organism. Here again, the
meaning matters more than the material similarity. For
instance, the nest building activity of the rodent can be
taken as an analogue of the daily activity of the human
subject. Biomarker validity is the similarity of biological
markers related to the presumed organism. What mat-
ters is the function of a marker, not its chemical compo-
sition. For instance, glucocorticoids do not come in the
same form in human subjects (cortisol) and in rodents
(corticosterone).
Predictive validity
The predictive validity of an animal model is the simi-
larity of the relation between, on the one hand, the trig-
gering factors and the occurrence of the disease and, on
the other hand, between the therapeutic agent and the
d i s e a s e( s e e[ 2 2 ]f o ram o r ec omprehensive definition).
Roughly speaking, it is the resemblance of the apparent
impact of the etiological factors and of the treatment on
the observable effects. This must not be conflated with
the effect of those factors and agents on the mechan-
isms producing the effect. The fact that a therapeutic
agent has a dramatic impact on a biological system does
not imply that it dramatically reduces the symptoms.
The reverse is also true of the dramatic action of an
agent or a factor on the symptoms (or on the biological
markers). The predictive validity of a model is assessed
without looking into the mechanism which is really at
work in the animal: generally it is assessed from a
macro-observational point of view or through peripheral
biological measurements (bi o m a r k e r s ) .Ap o i n tt ob e
mentioned here is that factors that alter the outcome of
a biomarker in the animal model might predict the out-
come of the same challenge in humans. For example, if
increasing the stimulus intensity induces a linear change
in the outcome in the animal, this should also be found
in the clinical situation. On the other hand, the mechan-
istic validity is assessed through direct observation of
what is really happening inside the pathological organ-
ism. So, one needs to assess the validity of this direct
link between ‘input’ and ‘output’ separately from the
resemblance of the mechanisms which presumably
transform the input into the output. Of course, one
must also distinguish induction validity from remission
validity. The former suggests that the action of the etio-
logical factors on the observable effects of the model
disease resemble its action on the observable effects of
the human disease. For example, if chronic stress trig-
gers depression-related biomarkers both in humans and
in animals, an animal model based on the chronic appli-
cation of stressors may have good induction validity. In
the latter, the action of the treatment on the observable
effects in the animal model may resemble its action on
the observable effects in the human disease. For exam-
ple, if chronic antidepressants induce remission in
humans, they should elicit the same effects in the ani-
mal model to score high on remission validity. Table 3
recaps these nine criteria.
Of course, all these criteria should be balanced with
the ethical implications formulated in the framework of
animal research (particularly the 3Rs: replacement,
refinement, reduction). For example, it can be that an
animal model scores high on all these validity scales
(indicating that it might participate in the refinement of
a procedure) but that it involves painful experiences for
the animals: in this case, the general high score for the
nine criteria should be balanced according to these ethi-
cal considerations.
Drawing a comparison with Willner’s criteria
The view we present here slightly differs from the pro-
posal made by Willner [26]. Comparisons between both
proposals can easily be made from Figure 3. Below we
provide a detailed comment on this figure.
Figure 3 shows that there is a partial overlap between
the items that are included in the criteria as some cri-
teria seem identical between both the views, for example
our ethological validity is identical to face validity as
proposed by Willner [26]. Some aspects are present in
Willner’s model and not in our view; for example, the
fact that some processes are a crucial feature of the dis-
ease had been included in Willner’s ‘construct validity’,
and is absent from our view. Some criteria are present
in our view but were absent from Willner’s, for example,
species validity. Further, the outlines of some concepts
are sometimes different, and do not include exactly the
same aspects in both views (for example, the concept of
face validity). More precisely:
1. Our concept of species validity was not explicitly
mentioned in the initial proposal by Willner. However,
it overlaps with the concept of homological validity that
has been extensively discussed previously [20] for its
relevance to animal models of psychiatric disorders (par-
ticularly those characterized by a deficit of high order
cognitive processing).
2. The concept of strain validity, as it corresponds to a
human-animal similarity of the genetic predisposition
that participates in the etiology of the disease, could be
included in Willner’s ‘construct validity’ concept, as the
similarity of the theories about the causes of the disor-
der was mentioned in his definition of construct validity.
The same applies to ontopathogenic validity and to trig-
gering validity. Here we propose to carefully disentangle
these different dimensions, as they might correspond to
very different constructs.
3. Our description of mechanistic validity only par-
tially overlaps with Willner’sc o n c e p t i o no fc o n s t r u c t
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biological and cognitive mechanisms that produce the
pathological outcomes. In Willner’s view, the cognitive
mechanisms were not explicitly included. Further, Will-
ner also included many other dimensions that are
clearly separate in our proposal. This was done to
account for the very different nature of the items that
were included in Willner’s view of construct validity, as
it included constructs about etiology, about the course
of the disease, and so on.
4. Ethological validity corresponds more or less to
Willner’s face validity, which was defined as the
Table 3 The criteria of validity for animal models.
Kind of validity Aspect of validity Object of validity (animal/human similarity of...)
homological validity species validity Species
strain validity strain
pathogenic validity ontopathogenic validity interaction transforming an initial organism into a vulnerable organism.
triggering validity interaction transforming an initial or a vulnerable organism into a pathological organism.
mechanistic validity theoretical cognitive or neurobiological mechanisms producing the observable effects of the disease.
face validity ethological validity behavioral symptoms of the disease
biomarker validity biomarkers associated with the disease
predictive validity induction validity relation between the triggering factor and the observable effects of the disease.
remission validity relation between the therapeutic agent and the observable effects of the disease.
Predictive
validity
Effects of treatments
Face validity
Symptoms
Construct validity
Crucial process
Dynamic
Etiology
Biological mechanism
Relationship biology-
behaviour
Biomarker 
validity
Mechanistic 
validity
Species validity
Strain validity
Ethological
validity
Early developmental
validity
Induction validity
Remission
validity
Etiopathogenic
validity
Cognitive mechanism
Figure 3 A comparison between Willner’s criteria and the present proposal. Willner’s criteria are represented by the brown circles and our
nine criteria are represented by squares with the same color code as in Figures 1 and 2. Where a square fully overlaps with one of Willner’s
criteria (or with one aspect of one of Willner’s criteria) it is represented inside the corresponding circle. Where it partially overlaps, it sits astride
the circle. Where the criterion (or an aspect of it) has not been described by Willner, it stands outside the circles. Arrows indicate which sub-
aspect of Willner’s criteria corresponds to our proposed criteria.
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what beyond that view, including also some aspects that
were previously included in construct validity, such as
the similarity in the course of the disease or its dynamic,
(for example, in the case of an animal model of bipolar
disorder, this would correspond to an alternation of
manic and depressive-like states).
5. The biomarker validity, corresponding to a similar-
ity of the biological markers, was not present per se in
Willner’s initial view. Indeed, he included an identity of
the biological mechanisms underlying the disease, but
the mechanisms were not separated from the markers.
However, this aspect was later included in face validity
[21].
6. Induction validity was not explicitly mentioned by
Willner. Rather, he focused on the identity of the rela-
tionship between the biological mechanism and the
symptoms (an item that was included in his conception
of construct validity and that is absent in our model)
w h i l ew ef o c u so nt h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h ec a u s e s
of the pathological outcome.
7. Remission validity more or less overlaps with Will-
ner’s view, particularly with the concept he developed in
his more recent papers, in which the effects of treat-
ments include non-pharmacological treatments.
An exploration of classic models
Let us now try to explore whether our proposal applies
to classic animal models. In order to simplify, we will
focus on one bioassay, the forced swimming test, and on
seven methods used to elicit depression-related beha-
viors: targeted mutation, maternal separation, learned
helplessness, UCMS, social defeat, bulbectomy and cor-
ticosterone administration.
The forced swimming test is a device enabling us to
model a behavior related to depression (resignation) and
to predict the effects of pharmacological treatments. It
might thus score moderately for ethological validity
(because it only mimics one symptom, and not a set of
symptoms) and high on therapeutic validity (as it has
been designed for this purpose). It might gain higher
scores if this device is used in animals that have been
subjected to pathogenic factors, if the strain is chosen in
a relevant way, if the study is undertaken in animals
that have been subjected to stress during adulthood, and
so on.
The seven other methods mimic some aspects of the
etiology, even if each of them focuses on different
aspects of it. Indeed, targeted mutation can be consid-
ered to score highly on strain validity, while maternal
separation rather focuses on ontopathogenic validity.
Learned helplessness, social defeat and UCMS all
manipulate triggering factors. Therefore, each of these
methods might gain validity if combined with other
dimensions of etiology (or lose validity in the opposite
case). For example, if UCMS is performed in BALB/c
mice, a strain exhibiting a polymorphism for genes ren-
dering the subject vulnerable to stress and displaying
poor maternal care, it might score not only for trigger-
ing validity, but also for strain and ontopathogenic valid-
ity. The same reasoning applies to social defeat and
learned helplessness. It will score lower if applied to
invertebrates than if applied to rodents, even if observa-
tions have shown that learned helplessness also evokes
behavioral alterations in invertebrates (see [39] for a
review). Concerning bulbectomy, it does not really
mimic an etiology of depression, because, in humans,
the loss of olfaction does not provoke self-rated depres-
sion [40] and as the olfactory dysfunctions seen in
depressed subjects mainly concern an alteration in the
hedonic rating of odors [41,42], a function that is asso-
ciated to the orbitofrontal cortex rather than to the
olfactory bulbs [43]. Finally, corticosterone administra-
tion during adulthood does not recapitulate strain or
ontopathogenic factors. However, this model partly
satisfies the etiological validity criterion, as chronic high
glucocorticoid levels, such as those observed in Cushing
syndrome, renders human subjects vulnerable to depres-
sive episodes [44,45].
Mechanistic validity corresponds to the fact that the
organism has been rendered pathological in some
aspects. This criterion is satisfied for most models, but
not for the bio-assay. Indeed, in all cases, the cognitive
and/or biological processes have been rendered patholo-
gical by the manipulations that have been performed on
the animals. For example, learned helplessness subjects
display a cognitive bias similar to that seen in depressed
subjects [46,47]. After bulbectomy, the animal displays
neurobiological alterations in several distal projection
areas of the olfactory bulbs, rendering the alterations
close to the ones observed in depressed subjects. After
maternal separation, chronic corticosterone or UCMS,
hippocampal-related alterations have been observed.
Further, the mechanism explaining the therapeutic
action for the treatments should be identical as well. For
example, if some restoration of functional negative feed-
back on the HPA underlies the therapeutic action of
antidepressant drugs in humans (see [48] for a review),
the same should be observed in the animal model,
which has indeed been found [49].
All models display ethological validity but at various
levels, as the observed alterations concern a more or
less wide range of behaviors (recapitulating several
symptoms, and not only one) and include more or less
crucial symptoms of depression (for example anhedonia
is more essential than irritability or anxiety-like beha-
vior). For example, in bioassays such as the forced swim
test only one aspect of the behavioral symptomatology
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well as in the social defeat model, anhedonia has been
observed together with other behaviors, such as social
avoidance (social defeat) or apathy (UCMS). Measurable
changes in biomarkers have been measured in some
models, such as altered levels of plasmatic corticoster-
one or of pro-inflammatory cytokines. It is obvious that
chronic alterations in biomarkers require that the ani-
mals be subjected to experimental manipulations over
long periods of time. For example, no alteration in the
regulation of corticosterone release will be observed
after forced swimming, while it can be observed after
UCMS or targeted mutation.
Finally, as we distinguished two aspects of predictive
validity (induction and remission), we have to discuss
these two aspects separately. Induction validity is about
the similarity of the relationship between the triggering
factor and the observable behavioral or biological out-
come. Indeed, it could be that the link between a trig-
gering factor and an outcome is similar in the human
condition and in the animal model even if the mechan-
ism underlying this relationship is largely unknown: in
this case, the model will satisfy the induction validity
criterion, but not the mechanistic validity. For example,
data concerning the neurobiological alterations displayed
by patients with panic disorder is rather sparse: in this
case, it is difficult to design an animal model with good
mechanistic validity, while it is still possible to achieve
induction validity, as it is easy to model the relationship
between factors triggering the panic attacks (for example
lactate or caffeine administration) and the symptomatol-
ogy. The reverse can also be observed when some
aspects of the pathological mechanism have been mod-
eled, while the relationship between the trigger and the
symptom is not reproduced. This is the case for bulbect-
omy: we have already seen that this model elicits some
aspects of the pathological mechanism (and so displays
mechanistic validity) but at the same time, because bul-
bectomy does not cause depression, it does not satisfy
induction validity. Concerning remission validity, it
focuses on the ability of treatments (both pharmacologi-
cal and non pharmacological ones) to reverse the patho-
logical features that are observed. As most models or
tests have been designed to detect the potential effec-
tiveness of treatments, this criterion is achieved in most
but not all models (bioassays, maternal separation,
UCMS, corticosterone administration, social defeat, bul-
bectomy, and so on). First, one has to observe that, in
some cases, the characteristics of the treatments are not
identical: for example, in the clinic, antidepressants elicit
therapeutic effects after chronic administration so when
an effect is observed after acute administration in the
animal model, this criterion is not achieved. This is the
case with bioassays, which in some cases respond after
acute or sub-chronic administration of the compound.
Further, in the case of targeted mutation, it could be
that, as the target of the treatment has been deleted, the
model will not answer to pharmacological challenges.
For example, knockouts for the noradrenaline transpor-
ter may not respond to inhibitors of the noradrenergic
transporter [50]. In this case, the null mutant cannot be
considered a valid model of depression, but rather as a
model of dysfunction of this transporter. As for the
induction validity criterion, the remission validity criter-
ion does not overlap with some aspects of mechanisms
validity.
Conclusion
What we have proposed is a general framework to assess
the validity of animal models of psychiatric disorders,
focusing on anxiety disorders and depression. It consists of
five general criteria: homological validity, pathogenic valid-
ity, mechanistic validity, face validity and predictive validity
(the last two being given a rather different meaning than in
Willner’s proposal). They may be consistent with the pro-
cedure to evaluate animal models recently proposed by
Van der Staay [10,22]. According to the objectives of a
given model, the relevance of these different criteria may
have to be hierarchized (see [10] for a discussion of the dif-
ferent targets of modeling). For example, these criteria may
not have the same importance if the scope of a model is
the search for new therapeutic strategies or if it is to under-
stand the mechanisms explaining the pathology (this is why
Van der Staay [22] and Cryan and Sweeney [51] are ada-
mant that models and tests should not be conflated). A
step further towards a precise assessment of the validity of
these models would be to propose scoring procedures for
each of these criteria. This is in part a quite different
approach, for it implies, among other things, using mathe-
matical tools, but also paying much more attention to the
researcher’s various aims when modeling a disease. More-
over, we think that the general framework we propose here
could also suit other fields where animal models are used,
in psychiatry of course (models of schizophrenia or autism),
but also in neurology, and more widely in research into all
diseases within the scope of translational medicine. How-
ever, they do not apply to models of normal emotions,
such as anxiety behavior for example: in this case, it is
probable that some criteria will not be relevant, such as
pathogenic validity.
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